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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
, • • • Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6147 
TOWN OF PINE PLAINS, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
.) 
A representation proceeding having been, conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, . 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-6147 -2 
Included: All full-time Motor Equipment Operators assigned to the Town of 
Pine Plains Highway Department. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a-concession. 
DATED: November 14,2012 ~ • ' 
Albany, New York 
H/jurviv^ J~>%</Nrp-i 
/j Jerome Lefko^vitz, CJp&irman 
i/ 
Sheila S. -ColeC Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6153 
TOWN OF MILTON, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in.accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 294 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of . 
grievances. 
Certification -C-6153 -2 
Included: Full-time employees of the Town Highway Department, including 
HEOs, MEOs, Mechanics and Laborers. -
Excluded: Highway Superintendent, Deputy Highway Superintendent, 
seasonal and temporary Highway Department employees, Town 
clerical employees and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 294. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
. negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written'agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either partyto agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: November 14, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairman 
4 -£2_ 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 








CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
EVERETT ROACH, for Petitioner 
JOHN W. PARK, ESQ., for Employer 
STEVEN A. CRAIN AND DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, CO-COUNSELS (STEVEN A. 
CRAIN of counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
) • 
On June 1, 2012, the Everett Roach (petitioner) filed a timely petition for 
decertification of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (intervenor), the current negotiating representative for employees in the 
following unit: 
Included: All Full-Timeand Regularly scheduled part-time employees in the 
titles of County Police Officer, County Police Sergeant and Crimina 
Excluded: Managerial/Confidential employees and Seasonal Personnel, and 
all other employees of the Sheriff. 
Upon consent of the parties, a mail ballot election was held on September 6, 
2012. The results of this election show that the majority of eligible employees in the 
unit who cast valid ballots no longer desire to be represented for purposes of collective 
negotiations by the intervenor. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it hereby is, 
decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: November 14, 2012 
Albany, New York 
/J Jerome Lefk^witz.pfiairman 
x
 Sheila S. Cole, Member 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOHN M. STORER, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASENO.C-6141 




CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
intervenor. 
JOHN M. STORER, for Petitioner 
JOHN W. PARK, ESQ., for Employer 
STEVEN A. CRAIN AND DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, CO-COUNSELS (STEVEN A. 
CRAIN of counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On June 4, 2012, the John M. Storer (petitioner) filed a timely petition for 
decertification of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (intervenor), the current negotiating representative for employees in the 
following unit: 
Included: County Police Lieutenant, County Corrections Lieutenant. : 
Upon consent of the parties, a. mail ballot election was held on September 6, 
2012. The results of this election show that the majority of eligible employees in the 
unit who cast valid ballots no longer desire to be represented for purposes of collective 
negotiations by the intervenor. 
THEREFORE,- IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it hereby is, 
decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: November 14, 2012 
Albany, New York 
'Jerome Lefkowij^ z, Chairman 
'1/ Sku^^fci 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MOHAWK VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
ADJUNCT AND PART-TIME ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6146 
MOHAWK VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
and COUNTY OF ONEIDA, 
Respondent. 
TRUDY RUDNICK, LABOR RELATIONS SPECIALIST, for Petitioner 
GREGORY AMOROSO, ESQ.!, ONEIDA COUNTY ATTORNEY, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION, CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND 
ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding was conducted in the above matter by the Public 
Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) and our Rules of Procedure (Rules). i 
Mohawk Valley Community College and the County of Oneida (Joint Employer) has 
filed objections to the determination made by the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) concluding that the showing of support submitted by the 
Mohawk Valley Community College Adjunct and Part-Time Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-
CIO (Association) is sufficient for certification without an election pursuant to §201.9(g)(1) of 
our Rules. 
^ . Case No. C-6146 -2-
/ • . • • 
The Joint Employer objects to certification without an election on the grounds that: a) 
it was denied a hearing during the investigation into the question of representation to 
. demonstrate that the defined unit does not correspond to a community of interest among 
the employees; b) the defined unit in the Director's determination is inappropriate; and c) 
certain employees are casual employees under the Act. 
The Joint Employer also asserts that it did not consent to the proposed unit on the 
ground that one of its components, County of Oneida (County), did not execute the consent 
agreement, and that the County Attorney representing the Joint Employer "felt compelled" to 
sign the agreement without consulting with the President of the other component, Mohawk 
Valley Community College (College). The Association supports the Director's 
) determination. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On June 14, 2012, the Association filed a petition seeking to represent a unit of 
employees working at the College. A copy of the petition was sent to the County and the 
College on June 21, 2012 along with a notice directing that a response be served and filed 
with ten working days after receipt of the notice. On July 6, 2012, the County Attorney filed 
a response on behalf of the Joint Employer. In the response, the Joint Employer asserted 
that there is an insufficient community of interest among employees in the petitioned-for 
unit, which includes adjunct faculty and part-time employees. In addition, the Joint 
Employer objected to inclusion of casual employees in the proposed unit. 
Thereafter, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to conduct the investigation 
) into the question of representation held a conference call with the parties on July 27, 2012, 
Case No. C-6146 -3 
seeking, inter alia, to resolve the issues related to unit composition raised by the Joint 
Employer. Following the conference call, the ALJ sent a confirming letter to the 
Association's representative and the County Attorney, representing the Joint Employer, 
scheduling a second conference call on August 23, 2012, for the purpose of resolving the 
remaining differences over unit composition with particular emphasis on the Joint 
Employer's concerns over inclusion of casual employees. In addition, the letter confirmed 
that the parties would meet in advance of the next conference call for the purpose of 
seeking to reach agreement over unit composition.1 
Following the August 23, 2012 conference call, the ALJ sent a letter to the 
Association's representative and the County Attorney confirming that a third conference call 
would take place on September 21, 2012. The letter further stated: 
The purpose of the conference call is to continue discussions 
regarding the above-referenced matter and work on agreeing to 
a unit that is mutually acceptable to both union and employer. 
Thus far, the union and employer have agreed to several 
exclusions and now will be focusing on specific job 
titles/positions that will be included. Finally, the union and 
employer will work on revising the list of employees with job 
titles/positions that will be included in the unit.2 
After the third conference call, the ALJ faxed a proposed consent agreement 
1
 In opposition to the Joint Employer's objections, the Association has submitted emails 
between the parties dated August 6 and 7, 2012 regarding a scheduled meeting on August 
20, 2012, seeking to reach agreement concerning the appropriate unit in advance of the 
August 23, 2012 conference call with the ALJ. See, Response to Exceptions, Exhibit D. 
2Attachedto the Association's Response to Exceptions are emails between the parties 
dated September 18, 19 and 20, 2012 demonstrating an electronic dialogue between the 
parties aimed at reaching a final agreement on unit composition. See, Response to 
Exceptions, Exhibits F, G, H, I and J. 
Case No. C-6146 -4 
to the Association's representative and the County Attorney that included a defined 
unit of employees working at the College. The defined unit was substantially 
modified from the proposed unit set forth in the Association's petition. Due to a 
ministerial error, however, the draft agreement identified the College, rather than the 
Joint Employer, as the employer. Nevertheless, it is not disputed that the Joint 
Employer is the public employer under the Act for the employees in the stipulated 
unit. The representative for each party signed the consent agreement and faxed it 
back to the ALJ. 
On September 25, 2012, the Director approved the consent agreement and 
sent the parties his determination that, pursuant to §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules, the 
Association satisfied the requirements for a certification Without an election. 
DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to §201.9(a)(2) of the Rules, a hearing is not required during the course of 
an investigation into a question of representation. As a result, an investigation can be 
completed without holding an evidentiary hearing.3 Under the Rule, whether a hearing is 
necessary is left to the discretion of the Director. 
In the present case, the ALJ conducted three conference calls during the 
investigation over the appropriate composition of the unit. The record demonstrates'that as 
the result of those calls, along with the direct meetings and communications between the 
parties, the parties were able to amicably resolve their differences concerning unit 
3
 State of New York (State University of New York, Stony Brook), 10 PERB 1]3081(1977); 
City of Amsterdam, 13 PERB TJ3083 (1980). 
Case No. C-6146 -5-
composition. The steady progress made by the parties is demonstrated by the ALJ's 
confirming letters, the emails between the parties, and the terms of the signed consent 
agreement. Contrary to the Joint Employer's argument, we find no evidence that the 
County Attorney was compelled or coerced by the ALJ into signing the consent agreement 
without consulting with the College President. In fact, the signed agreement was returned 
by the County Attorney without written objection. 
The statutory criteria for determining unit composition are those set forth in §207.1 of 
the Act. Although the Joint Employer now claims that the unit defined in the consent 
agreement is inappropriate, it fails to articulate any specific facts to support that argument. 
A casjual employee is, by definition, not a public employee under the Act.4 Nevertheless, 
the Joint Employer has not identified a single individual in the stipulated unit who it claims 
meets the definition of a casual employee. 
Therefore, we deny the Joint Employer's objections centered upon the fact that a 
hearing was not conducted during the investigation, and its challenge to the 
appropriateness of the stipulated unit. 
Finally, we reject the assertion that the Joint Employer did not consent to the 
proposed unit because the County did not execute the consent agreement, and that the 
County Attorney did not consult with the College's President before signing the consent 
agreement. The Joint Employer is a single employer under the Act, comprised of the 
County and College. The County Attorney filed a response and acted on behalf of the Joint 
4
 See, State of New York, 5 PERB1J3022 (1972). 
Case No. C-6146 -6-
Employer throughout the processing of the petition. The mere existence of a ministerial 
error in the consent agreement does not demonstrate that the County Attorney was not 
acting on behalf of the Joint Employer when he executed the consent agreement. The 
purported lack of consultation by the County Attorney with the College President before 
signing the agreement might raise a legal ethics issue but such issues are beyond our 
jurisdiction.5 
Based upon our review of the record, it appears that a negotiating representative has 
been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Mohawk Valley Community College Adjunct and 
Part-Time Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-referenced Joint Employer in the following unit as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement 
of grievances: 
Included: Adjunct, Administrative Support Specialist, Advisor, Assistant Coach, CCED 
Coordinator, Coach, Communications Specialist, Ex-Offender Program 
Counselor, Fitness Center Coach, Fitness Center Staff, Fitness Center 
Supervisor, Lab Assistant, Librarian, Licensed Mental Health Counselor, 
Lifeguard, Part Time Professional, Part Time Professional Child Care, Part 
Time Professional Media, Part Time Program Specialist-CCED, Part Time 
Teacher, Professional Tutor, Program Specialist, Student Service Specialist, 
Technical Assistant, Technical Assistant -Events, Technical Assistant-Video, 
Technical Assistant-Tool Club and Tutor. 
5
 Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of Buffalo, 24 PERB 1J3033 (1991). 
Case No. C-6146 
-7-
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that Mohawk Valley Community College and County of 
Oneida, as a Joint Employer, shall negotiate collectively with the Mohawk Valley Community 
College Adjunct and Part-Time Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: November 14, 2012 
Albany, New York 
WJM"*-^ 
// Jerome Lefkowjfz, Chairperson 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
FEDERATION OF CATHOLIC TEACHERS OFFICE 
& PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES, OPEIU LOCAL 153 
Petitioner, CASE NO. CE-6017 
-and- CASE NO. CE-6083 
MONSIGNOR FARRELL HIGH SCHOOL, 
Petitioner-Employer, 
-and -
LAY FACULTY ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 255, LIUNA, 
Intervenor. 
COHEN, LEDER, MONTALBANO & GROSSMAN LLP (BRUCE D. LEDER, 
ESQ, of counsel), for Petitioner Federation of Catholic Teachers Office & 
Professional Employees, OPEIU Local 153 
SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP (JAMES R. HAYS, ESQ of 
counsel), for Petitioner-Employer Monsignor Farrell High School 
ARCHER, BYINGTON, GELNNON & LEVINE LLP (JAMES W. VERSOCKI, 
ESQ, of counsel) for Intervenor Lay Faculty Association, Local 255, LIUNA 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to the Board on a motion, pursuant to 12 NYCRR §253.6, by 
the Lay Faculty Association, Local 255, LIUNA (Association) seeking review of a letter 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concerning a petition filed by Federation 
of Catholic Teachers Office & Professional Employees, OPEIU Local 153 (Federation) 
(CE-6017) and a petition filed by Monsignor Farrell High School (High School) (CE-
6083) regarding representation of employees at the High School pursuant to §705 of the 
State Employment Relations Act (SERA). 
In its motion, the Association seeks reversal of the letter decision informing the 
parties that the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
had determined that the Federation's petition should be processed over the 
Association's objections and that an election be scheduled concerning the two pending 
representation petitions. In addition, the Association seeks an order dismissing both 
petitions. The Federation opposes the Association's motion; the High School has not 
responded to the motion. 
Following our review of the arguments made by the Association and Federation, 
we deny the Association's motion. 
FACTS 
Prior to September 1, 2009, the employer of the High School employees was the 
Catholic High School Association of New York (Catholic High School Association). The 
High School Employees were part of a bargaining unit consisting of employees from ten 
parochial high schools, which comprised the Catholic High School Association. In 
January 2009, however, the Board of Trustees of the Catholic High School Association 
approved a resolution to cease operating the ten high schools at the end of the 2008-
2009 academic year, and that each high school become a separate education 
corporation. ' . -
On or about June 30, 2009, the Federation filed a representation petition, 
supported by a showing of interest, seeking to represent lay faculty employees at the 
High School.1 It is undisputed that the Association is the incumbent collective 
1
 The Federation's petition was filed with the State Employment Relations Board 
(SERB). The processing of the petition was held in abeyance based upon the 
pendency of related unfair labor practice charges, which were subsequently resolved. 
Cffo^+i\/Q Ink/ 99 OC\"\r\ Q P R R \A/OC aho l i choH anr l t h o rocnnnc ih i l i t i oc rvf aHmin i c to r i nn 
bargaining representative of the at-issue employees at the High School, and was their 
representative at the time the Federation filed its petition. 
On September 1, 2009, the Catholic High School Association dissolved, at which 
point the High School became the employer of the at-issue employees. On or about 
September 28, 2011, the High School filed its petition seeking to decertify the 
Association. The three parties have agreed that the following unit of High School 
employees is appropriate: all full-time and part-time lay faculty including librarians and 
guidance counselors, and excluding religious, supervisory and management 
employees. 
On June 22, 2012, the ALJ conducted a conference concerning the two pending 
petitions. During the conference, the parties stipulated to certain undisputed facts but 
the Association objected to entering into a consent agreement for the conduct of an 
election. As a result of the conference, the ALJ.granted the parties an opportunity to 
brief the issues of whether the Federation's petition should be processed and whether 
the Federation should be permitted to intervene in the representation case filed by the 
High School. After consideration of the submissions made by the Federation and 
Association, the ALJ issued his letter decision, dated August 2, 2012. In the letter 
decision, the ALJ stated that the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) had determined that an election should be conducted. The 
decision also stated that the Director had concluded that the ballot should permit eligible 
voters to select the Federation, the Association or no representation. In addition, the 
decision stated that the Director had rejected the Federation's argument that the 
Association's petition should not be processed. 
i DISCUSSION 
j 
Under SERA, the filing of a representation petition will trigger an agency 
investigation to determine various issues including whether there is a question or 
controversy concerning the representation of the at-issue employees, what is the 
appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining, and what procedure should be 
utilized to determine employee choice.2 
The conduct of agency investigations into questions of representation under our 
public sector and private sector jurisdictions is delegated to the Director, who functions 
on behalf of the Board, and the Director is authorized to assign an ALJ to conduct the 
investigation.3 If it is determined during an investigation that the applicable facts are not 
in dispute, a formal investigatory hearing is unnecessary. 
) In the present case, the relevant facts and the appropriate unit for collective 
bargaining were resolved at the June 22, 2011 conference conducted by the assigned 
( . . . . 
ALJ. Therefore, an investigatory hearing was unnecessary. At that time, however, the 
Association refused to enter into a consent agreement regarding the conduct of an 
election. 
Upon our review of the Association's motion and the Federation's response, we 
deny the motion because the Association has failed to demonstrate extraordinary 
circumstances warranting the grant of interlocutory relief from the Director's decision to 
conduct an election in these cases. 
In addition, we find no merit to the Association's argument that the Federation's 
petition should be dismissed as defective because the High School was not the 
J : 
2
 Lab Law §705; 12 NYCRR §§251.15-18. 
employer and the appropriate unit did not exist at the time the Federation filed its 
petition. It is undisputed that the High School became the successor employer for the 
at-issue employees on September 1, 2009, and the Federation's pending petition 
sought to represent a unit composed of those employees. 
Questions related to identification of the employer of the at-issue employees, 4 
and the definition of the appropriate unit, can arise during the course of a representation 
investigation. Therefore, the mere fact that the High School succeeded the Catholic 
High School Association as employer during the pendency of the petition, and the 
definition of the appropriate unit was not determined until after the petition was filed, 
are not sufficient bases for the dismissal of the Federation's petition.5 
In rejecting the Association's arguments, we note that allegations of a petition 
under SERA are not subject to strict scrutiny, and we will not dismiss one because a 
petitioner fails to allege all relevant information.6 Furthermore, unlike our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), the current procedural rules applicable to petitions under SERA do 
not include filing timeframes.7 
Finally, we find no merit to the Association's assertion that the High School's 
petition should be dismissed. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the Association's motion, and conclude that 
the following unit is the most appropriate: 
Included: All full-time and part-time lay faculty including librarians and 
guidance counselors. 
4
 See, Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 49 SERB 184 (1995). 
5
 See generally, Barker Automation, Inc, 132 NLRB 794 (1961). 
612NYCRR§251.4. 
7 /->_ r->..i~„ pi->r\* r> ...u-u < n M\z/"^OD C I E M «t 
Excluded: Religious, supervisory and management employees. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the cases are hereby remanded to the 
Director for further processing of the representation petitions consistent with our 
decision. 
DATED: November 14, 2012 
Albany, New York -V 
{../ /fiscrhLA.^ 
/ < '7Jerome Lefkowitz( ChairneYson 
^ " n ClJ C2L. 
-2_-£__fi 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STONY POINT POLICEMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASENO.U-29118 
TOWN OF STONY POINT, 
Respondent. 
BUNYAN & BAUMGARTNER LLP (JOSEPH P. BAUMGARTNER of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
FEERICK LYNCH MacCARTNEY, PLLC (BRIAN D, NUGENT of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Town of Stony Point 
(Town) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge(ALJ) on an improper practice 
charge filed by the Stony Point Policemen's Benevolent Association, Inc. (Association), 
finding that the Town violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it unilaterally reassigned to nonunit employees security duties at the 
Town Court that had been exclusively performed by Association unit members.1 
In its exceptions, the Town asserts that the ALJ erred in concluding that the 
parties' past practice demonstrated a discernible boundary between the at-issue work 
and other similar duties performed by nonunit personnel, and in failing to apply the 
1
 45 PERB 114565 (2012). 
balancing test under Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority? (Niagara Frontier) 
because there has been significant change in job qualifications for the at-issue duties. 
The Association supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the ALJ's decision, in part, and 
reverse it in part. ' 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are fully set forth in the ALJ' s decision. They are repeated 
here only as necessary to address the Town's exceptions. 
The Association represents a unit comprised of full-time Town police officers. 
Beginning in February 2006, Association unit employees were assigned to provide 
security duties during the morning and afternoon sessions of the Town's Justice Court, 
when criminal and vehicle and traffic cases are generally heard. Security duties for 
Justice Court evening sessions, however, were provided by the Town's part-time police 
officers, who are not members of the bargaining unit. 
In January 2009, the Town reassigned security duties to nonunit Town court 
security officers for all three sessions of Justice Court. The minimum qualifications for 
the court security officer position are four years of high school, and a pistol permit. In 
addition, prior law enforcement experience is.desirable. Court security officers are not 
sworn police officers! The duties reassigned to court security officers during the morning 
and afternoon court sessions are identical to those that were exclusively performed by 
Association unit members between February 2006 and January 2009. 
218 PERB H3083(1985). 
DISCUSSION 
Under the framework established in Niagara Frontier, there are two essential 
questions that must be determined when deciding whether the transfer of unit work 
violates §209-a. 1(d) of the Act: a) was the at-issue work exclusively performed by unit 
employees for a sufficient period of time to have become a binding past practice; and b) 
was the work assigned to non-unit personnel substantially similar to that exclusive unit 
work. If both these questions are answered in the affirmative, we will find a violation of 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act unless there has been a significant change in job qualifications. 
Absent such a change, the loss of the at-issue work to the unit is a sufficient detriment 
for the finding of a violation. When there has been a significant change in job 
qualifications, however, we must balance the respective interests of the public employer 
and the unit employees to determine whether §209-a.1(d) of the Act has been violated.3 
In his decision, the ALJ concluded that a discernible boundary exists between the 
security duties performed by Association unit members during the morning and 
afternoon court sessions and the similar duties of nonunit employees during the evening 
sessions. In reaching his conclusion, the ALJ correctly applied the past practice 
analysis set forth in Manhasset Union Free School District.4 Among the criteria utilized 
in determining whether an enforceable past practice has established a discernible 
boundary are the nature and frequency of the work, the geographic location of the work, 
the employer's explicit or implicit rationale for the practice, and other facts establishing 
3
 Town of Riverhead, 42 PERB 1J3032 (2009). 
4
 41 PERB fl3005 (2008), confirmed sub nom., and mod in part, Manhasset Union Free 
Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 61 AD3d 1231,42 PERB 1J7004 (3d Dept 
2009), on remittitur, 42 PERB H3016 (2009). 
that the at-issue work has been treated distinct from other work performed by nonunit 
personnel.5 Based upon our review of the record, we affirm that portion of the ALJ's 
decision finding that the parties' past practice established a discernible boundary 
concerning the at-issue unit work. 
We reach a different conclusion, however, with respect to the ALJ's failure to 
apply the balancing test set forth in Niagara Frontier in light of the undisputed fact that 
the at-issue work was transferred from police officers to civilians. Under our precedent, 
it is well-settled that an employer's civilianization of uniformed services constitutes a de 
facto change in job qualifications.6 
In Fairview Fire District,7 we rejected the argument by the charging party that a 
respondent in a transfer of unit work case must affirmatively plead and prove a change 
in job qualifications. Nevertheless, the ALJ in the present case chose to avoid 
determining the issue of a change in job qualifications based on the procedural ground 
that the Town failed to plead it as an affirmative defense in its answer. Simply put, it 
was an error under Fairview Fire District for the ALJ to fail to determine the issue based 
upon the Town's pleading. Furthermore, we find it unnecessary to reexamine the 
question of whether a change in job qualifications should constitute an affirmative 
defense. In the present case, the Association's charge and the evidence demonstrate 
5
 Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, supra, note 2. 
6
 Fairview Fire Dist, 29 PERB jf3042 (1996); State of New York (DOCS), 27 PERB 
1J3055 (1994), confirmed sub nom., State of New York (Dept of Correctional Services) v 
Kinsella, 220 AD2d 19, 29 PERB 1J7008 (3d Dept 1996). 
7
 Supra, note 6. 
that both the Association and the Town knew that the at-issue work was transferred 
from police officers to civilians.8 
Based upon the undisputed fact that the transfer of unit work went from police 
officers to civilians, there has been a change in qualifications, which requires the 
application of the balancing test under Niagara Frontier. We conclude, however, that a 
remand to the ALJ is unnecessary because both parties were provided with a full and 
fair opportunity to present evidence and neither party requests a remand to present 
additional evidence. 
The record demonstrates that the only loss to the Association and its members 
resulting from the Town's unilateral action is the loss of the at-issue work. There is no 
evidence that the transfer caused the Association to lose members or that Association 
unit employees were terminated or denied benefits. As a result, we conclude that the 
Town's interests associated with the civilianization of the at-issue work outweigh the 
interests of the unit employees, and therefore find that the Town did not violate §209-
a.1(d)oftheAct. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town's exceptions are granted, in part, 
and the charge is dismissed. 
DATED: November 14, 2012 
Albany, New York / ] 
/ / Jerome Lefkow/tz, Chairperson , 
I_. . <^4~^—>——-—__ 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
8
 See, NYCTA, 20 PERB H3037 (1987), confirmed sub nom., NYCTA v New York State 
Pub Empl Rel Bd, 147 AD2d 574, 22 PERB 1J7001 (2d Dept 1989), mot to amend 
granted, 156 AD2d 689, 23 PERB 1[7002 (2d Dept 1989). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Teamsters Local 529, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge alleging that the Town of 
Tuscarora (Town) violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it abolished the Motor Equipment Operator (MEO) position 
held by Gerald Eccleston, Sr. (Eccleston) because he had engaged in protected activity 
under the Act.1 In the decision, the ALJ granted the Town's motion to dismiss after IBT 
rested its case, concluding that IBT failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a 
prima facie case of improper motivation under §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
As part of its exceptions, IBT contends that the ALJ erred by failing to grant all 
145PERB|f4540(2012). 
reasonable inferences to the evidence it presented, and that the ALJ misconstrued or 
ignored circumstantial evidence in the record. It also objects to the ALJ's reliance upon 
findings made in a report and recommendation of a Civil Service Law §75 hearing 
officer concerning misconduct charges against Eccleston. Finally, IBT claims that the 
ALJ erred by refusing IBT's request to treat Town Supervisor Robert V. Nichols 
(Nichols) as an adverse witness, and crediting a portion of his testimony. The Town 
supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we reverse the ALJ's decision to dismiss the charge, and remand the case for further 
processing consistent with our decision. 
FACTS 
When considering IBT's exceptions challenging the ALJ's grant of the Town's 
motion to dismiss at the close of IBT's case, we must grant all reasonable inferences to 
the evidence presented.2 The following recitation of facts is based upon our de novo -
application of that liberal standard. 
IBT is the recognized exclusive representative for all full-time Town MEO 
employees.3 The Town and IBT are parties to a collectively negotiated agreement 
(agreement), which includes an article concerning discipline and a separate article 
setting forth a grievance procedure ending in binding arbitration. Under the disciplinary 
article, an MEO employed after September 1, 1996 who has satisfied probation, is 
entitled to Civil Service Law §75 rights concerning discharge and/or suspension, and it 
2
 Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Ruiz), 43 PERB 1J3022 
(2010); County of Nassau (Police Dept), 17 PERB 1J3013 (1984). 
3
. lnint FYhihit? 810? 
states that any "[djisciphnary action, including discharge or suspension, shall be 
imposed only for just cause." 
Eccleston began working as a full-time Town MEO in 2002; he became an IBT 
shop steward shortly thereafter. In late August 2008, Town representatives met with 
Eccleston and IBT representatives about Eccleston's possible misconduct concerning 
the delivery of gravel to his property in a Town vehicle for alleged personal use. 
Although Eccleston and IBT believed the Town's concerns were fully addressed at that 
meeting, Eccleston was served with Civil Service Law §75 disciplinary charges in early 
October 2008 seeking his termination and suspending him without pay. The 
disciplinary charges were issued by the Highway Superintendent. 
Eccleston was represented by IBT at the Civil Service Law §75 disciplinary 
hearing, which was conducted by a Town appointed hearing officer. The Town 
Highway Superintendent testified against Eccleston concerning the merits of the 
disciplinary charges. , 
Following the hearing, the hearing officer issued a report and recommendation 
dated January 30, 2009, finding Eccleston guilty of misconduct and recommending a 
sixty-day suspension without pay. In the report and recommendation, the hearing 
officer stated that the record before him demonstrated that the Highway Superintendent 
considered Eccleston to be a very good employee. 
On February 12, 2009, the Highway Superintendent issued a letter terminating 
Eccleston for the misconduct. In response, IBT processed a February 20, 2009 
grievance challenging the discharge under the parties' agreement. After the Town held 
a grievance hearing on April 24, 2009, at which Eccleston was represented by IBT, 
Town Supervisor Nichols issued a letter dated May 6, 2009, which stated that the 
contractual grievance procedure is inapplicable for reviewing disciplinary action, and 
stating that the proper procedure for review is an Article 78 proceeding. 
Thereafter, IBT served and filed a demand for arbitration with respect to the 
grievance, and it provided representation to Eccleston in a Civil Practice Law and Rules 
(CPLR) Article 78 proceeding challenging his termination, which the Town opposed. 
The Town also commenced a CPLR Article 75 proceeding seeking to stay the 
arbitration of the disciplinary grievance, and IBT cross-petitioned for an order 
compelling arbitration pursuant to CPLR Article 75. The special proceedings were 
consolidated for argument and decision by the court. 
, In September 2009, Supervisor Nichols began working on the tentative 2010 
annual budget and submitted it to the Town Clerk on or before September 30, 2009.4 
In the prior three calendar years, the Town adopted budgets that were generally 
consistent with the tentative budgets prepared by Nichols.5 For 2010, Supervisor 
Nichols proposed the following increases in highway personal service appropriations 
from the 2009 adopted budget: $2,300 in personal services for general repairs; $700 in 
miscellaneous personal services; and $1,500 in personal services for snow removal. 
The tentative budget estimated that the Town's annual highway revenue would be 
$522,380, which was premised upon expected increases from real property taxes and 
state aid. 
On September 30, 2009, the court issued its written decision and order granting 
4
 Transcript, pp. 103-05. 
5
 Transcript, p. 127. 
the Article 78 petition, and annulling the discharge, finding that the Town deprived 
Eccleston of due process of law because the Highway Superintendent issued the 
disciplinary charges, testified at the disciplinary hearing, and then made the decision to 
terminate. The court remitted the matter to the Town for the conduct of a de novo 
determination by a disinterested person. In addition, the court denied the Town's 
Article 75 petition and granted IBT's cross-petition to compel arbitration of the 
grievance, concluding that the parties' agreement did not limit the remedies for 
challenging a disciplinary action. 
The Town Board met on October 14, 2009 and made adjustments in the 
amounts of the tentative 2010 budget.6 On the same day, Nichols issued a letter 
terminating Eccelston, effective February 12, 2009. Nichols' letter is virtually identical to 
the Highway Superintendent's original February 12, 2009 termination letter.7 
At a budget meeting on October 19, 2009, the Town Board adopted a 
preliminary budget reducing the proposed highway appropriations for personal services 
for general repairs from $74,000 to'$64,800, and reduced the appropriations for 
personal services for snow removal from $47,200 to $43,385. At the same time, the 
preliminary budget increased miscellaneous personal services from $4,800 to $5,500.8 
As a Town Board member, Nichols voted in favor of adopting the preliminary budget. 
6
 Transcript, pp. 106-07. 
7
 Charging Party Exhibits 3 and 6. 
8
 Joint Exhibit 11. 
Also present at the meeting were the Highway Superintendent and the Deputy Highway 
Superintendent. 9 
A public hearing regarding the preliminary budget was held during a regular 
Town Board meeting on November 5, 2009. At the beginning of the hearing, Nichols 
stated that the preliminary budget constituted a 1.3% increase. At the end of the 
hearing, the Town Board voted 3-2 to pass the 2010 budget, with Nichols in the 
majority. Although the minutes of that meeting reveal Town Board discussions 
regarding the budget and certain highway department issues, the minutes do not reflect 
a decision to abolish Eccleston's MEO position.10 On November 15, 2009, however, 
Eccleston learned from the Highway Superintendent-elect that the Town Board had 
decided.to abolish his MEO position, effective January 1, 2010. The Town did not 
directly inform IBT of its decision to abolish the position until December 2009.11 At its 
December 31, 2009 meeting, the Town Board transferred $40,000 from one Highway 
Department account to another. 
At the time of the decision to abolish Eccleston's position, Nichols and the Town 
Board were aware of IBT's intent to proceed to arbitration regarding the grievance over 
Eccleston's discipline.12 . * 
9
 Joint Exhibit 13. 
10
 Joint Exhibit 13. Similarly, the minutes of the Town Board meetings on December 14 
and December 31, 2009 do not reference a decision to abolish the MEO position. Joint 
Exhibit 13. 
11
 Transcript, pp. 94-95; Charging Party Exhibit 17. 
12
 Transcript, p. 97. 
Despite the court's annulment of Eccleston's first termination, the Town did not 
reimburse Eccleston for back wages for the period between the February 12, 2009 and 
October 14, 2009 letters of termination. Furthermore, the record reveals that following 
the abolition of Eccleston's MEO position, the Town continued to employ nonunit 
employees to perform the same or similar duties previously performed by Eccleston.13 
The arbitration concerning the disciplinary grievance was heard on March 26, 
2010. On June 10, 2010, the arbitrator issued his decision and award concluding that 
the Town lacked just cause to terminate, and imposed a one-week suspension without 
pay. In addition, the arbitrator directed the Town to make Eccleston whole for lost 
salary with interest and contractual benefits for the period October 6, 2008 through 
December 31, 2009. Finally, the arbitrator ordered: 
The Town is directed to offer the Grievant reinstatement to 
' his MEO job should that position be restored by PERB, a 
court, or the Town voluntarily. In that event the back pay 
and benefits due the Grievant will extend withinterest from 
December 31, 2009 to the date of the Town's reinstatement 
offer to the Grievant.14 
• Following the arbitral decision, the Town has not offered reemployment to 
Eccleston but it did hire a nonunit employee to work a full schedule performing the 
duties previously performed by Eccleston. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin with three procedural issues raised in IBT's exceptions: the ALJ's reliance 
upon findings of fact made by the Civil Service Law §75 hearing officer; the ALJ's refusal to 
declare Nichols as an adverse witness; and the ALJ's crediting a portion of Nichols' 
13
 Joint Exhibits 5, 6 and 17; Transcript, pp. 54-57. 
14
 Joint Exhibit 1. 
testimony. 
In State of New York (Division of Parole),15 we recognized that when the underlying 
facts in a disciplinary arbitration and a related improper practice charge are the same, it is 
appropriate to defer to the factual findings previously determined by the disciplinary 
arbitrator. We noted, however, that §205.5(d) of the Act prohibits a similar deference to 
findings made by a disciplinary hearing officer selected by the employer pursuant to Civil 
Service Law §75.16 
In light of this statutory restriction, we find that the ALJ erred by deferring to the 
factual findings and conclusions made in the report and recommendation of the Civil 
Service Law §75 hearing officer even though the document was introduced by IBT.17 
Instead, the ALJ should have deferred to the findings of the neutral disciplinary 
arbitrator concerning the factual predicate for the disciplinary charges, the scope of the 
misconduct and the appropriate disciplinary penalty.18 
We also find merit to IBT's challenge to the ALJ's denial of the request for Nichols to 
be deemed an adverse witness. When a party calls an adverse party to testify, hostility is 
assumed, and leading questions are therefore permissible.19 In the present case, the ALJ 
15
 41 PERB 1J3033 (2008). 
16
 See also, Unified Court System (McConnell), 41 PERB 1J3038 (2008). 
17
 Charging Party Exhibit 2. Similarly, we reject IBT's effort to rely upon other aspects 
of the report and recommendation to support its exceptions. See, IBT Brief in Support 
of Exceptions, p. 15. ^ 
18
 Joint Exhibit 1. 
19
 Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Ruiz), supra, note 2. See 
also, Becker v Koch, 104 NY 394 (1887); Arlene W v Robert D, 36 AD2d 455 (4th Dept 
1971); Jordan v Parrinello, 144 AD2d 540 (2d Dept 1988); Fox v Tedesco, 15 AD3d 
53R (Or\ n a n t 9 0 0 . ^ 
refused to declare Nichols an adverse witness until she made a factual determination that 
he was hostile while testifying.20 While that ruling was in error based upon Nichols's status 
as Town Supervisor, the record reveals that the ALJ gave IBT wide latitude in questioning 
Nichols, including the use of leading questions. As a result, we find the ALJ's ruling to be 
harmless error. 
We are not persuaded, however, by IBT's exception challenging the ALJ's 
crediting of Nichols's testimony concerning his lack of knowledge about an obligation by 
the Town to pay back wages to Eccleston for the period between February 12, 2009 
and October 14, 2009. Substantial deference is generally due to an ALJ's credibility 
determination, and we find no objective evidence in the record to disturb the ALJ's 
credibility finding.21 
We next turn to IBT's exceptions that claim that the ALJ failed to grant all 
reasonable inferences to its evidence and misconstrued or ignored circumstantial evidence 
in the record. 
In County of Nassau (Police Department)22 we articulated the applicable standard 
when an ALJ is determining a motion to dismiss an improper proper practice at the 
conclusion of a charging party's case: 
In our view, a motion made to a hearing officer to dismiss a 
charge after the presentation of charging party's evidence 
should not be granted without careful deliberation. In 
considering such a motion, a hearing officer must assume 
the truth of ajl of charging party's evidence and give the 
20
 Transcript, pp. 102-03. The ruling is reaffirmed in the ALJ's decision. Supra, note 1, 
45 PERB U4540 at 4607, n.6. 
21
 Dansville Support Staff Assn (Johnson), 45 PERB 1J3012 (2012). 
22
 Supra, note 2. 
charging party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that 
could be drawn from those assumed facts. We would 
reverse a hearing officer's decision to grant such a motion 
unless we could conclude that the evidence produced by the 
charging party, including all reasonable inferences 
therefrom, is plainly insufficient even in the absence of any 
rebuttal by the respondent to warrant a finding that the 
charge should be sustained.23 
In applying this standard, an ALJ is required to accept the charging party's evidence as 
true, and give it the benefit of every reasonable inference that can reasonably be drawn 
24 
from that evidence. -* • 
To demonstrate that the Town violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act, IBT has the 
burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of evidence that: a) Eccleston engaged in 
protected activity under the Act; b) such activity was known to the person or persons taking 
the employment action; and c) the employment action would not have been taken "but for" 
the protected activity.25 
As the ALJ correctly concluded, IBT presented sufficient evidence demonstrating 
the first two elements of a prima facie case of improper motivation under the Act. ^ 
Eccleston engaged in protected activity under the Act known to the Town when IBT: 
vigorously represented him during the Civil Service Law §75 hearing; processed the 
23
 Supra, note 2, 17 PERB H3013 at 3029-30. 
24
 Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Baez), 35 PERB fi3044 
(2002); Bd of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Freedman), 34 PERB 
113036(2001). 
25
 United Fedn of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (Jenkins), 41 PERB 1J3007 (2008), 
confirmed sub nom., Jenkins v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 41 PERB ^7007 (Sup 
Ct New York County 2008) affd, 67 AD3d 567, 42 PERB 1J7008 (1s t Dept 2009), Iv 
denied, 43 PERB 1J7003 (2010); State of New York (Division of Parole), 41 PERB 
P033 (2008); County of Wyoming, 34 PERB 1J3042 (2001); Stockbridge Valley Cent 
Sch Dist, 26 PERB fl3007 (1993); County of Orleans, 25 PERB 1J3010 (1992); Town of 
InriGne.nriemr.G 23 PFRR 113090 M990V Citv nf Salamanca 18 PFRR 1T3012 C1985V 
disciplinary grievance; and prosecuted the court litigation concerning the discharge and the 
arbitrability of the related grievance. 
Following our review of the record, however, we reject the ALJ's conclusion that 
IBT failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy the third element of a prima facie case 
because the ALJ failed to grant all reasonable inferences to IBT's evidence. For example, 
the ALJ drew a negative inference against IBT for not questioning Nichols concerning his 
position on the changes to the tentative budget, concluded that the timing of the decision to 
abolish was not significant and found "nothing improper" with the Town opposing the 
arbitrability of the grievance. Therefore, the decision to dismiss the charge at the 
conclusion of IBT's case must be reversed. 
As we recognized in United Federation of Teachers (Jenkins),26 circumstantial 
evidence is a common evidentiary tool employed by charging parties to demonstrate 
improper motivation. .This is due to the practical reality that improper motivation is 
rarely overt, and in "some cases, circumstantial evidence can be more persuasive than 
direct evidence in establishing unlawful motivation."27 To meet the relatively low initial 
threshold for demonstrating a prima facie case, a charging party's circumstantial 
evidence must be sufficient to give rise to an inference that improper motivation under 
the Act was a factor in respondent's actions. If the circumstantial evidence establishes 
that inference, the burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent to rebut the inference 
by presenting evidence demonstrating that its conduct was motivated by a legitimate 
M
 Supra note 25. 
27
 United Fedn of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (Jenkins), supra note 25, 41 PERB 
1J3007 at 3043. 
non-discriminatory business reason. At all times, however, the burden of proof 
remains with the charging party. 
Among the most common forms of circumstantial evidence that can create an 
inference of improper motivation are the timing and context of an adverse employment 
action, disparate treatment, the resurrection of disciplinary allegations and the 
pretextual rationale given for the adverse employment action. Temporal proximity of an 
employer's action is highly probative in determining improper motivation because timing 
can imply causation.29 Similarly, disparate treatment, such as the failure of an 
employer to terminate a nonunit employee performing similar duties to those previously 
performed by a laid-off unit employee who engaged in protected activity, can suggest 
an improper motivation.30 
In the present case, the tentative budget prepared by Nichols before the court's 
decision did not call for the abolition of a position. Two weeks after that decision, 
however, Nichols issued his termination letter on the same day the Town Board began 
discussing that tentative budget. Five days later, Nichols voted in favor of a preliminary 
budget that included a downward adjustment in personal services but included a 1.3% 
net increase in the overall budget from the prior year. While personal services in other 
departments may have been lowered as well, the evidence reveals that Eccleston's 
position was the only position eliminated. Although Nichols testified that the decision to 
abolish the position was made by the Town Board, the minutes of the Board meetings 
28
 State of New York (Division of Parole), supra, note 15; State of New York (SUNYat 
Buffalo), 33 PERB H3020 (2000). 
29
 Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Ruiz), supra, note 2. 
30
 Flwnnd Union Free Sch Dist. 43 PERB 1T3012 (201OY 
are silent concerning that decision, and we do not have any evidence before us 
explaining Nichols' rationale for supporting the changes contained in the adopted Town 
budget. Furthermore, there is no clear evidence in the record explaining the Town 
Board's December 31, 2009 decision to transfer $40,000 from one Highway 
Department account to another. Finally, the record contains evidence of disparate 
treatment based upon the Town's continued employment of nonunit employees 
performing the same or similar duties following abolition of Eccleston's position; along 
with the Town's decision to hire'a nonunit employee instead of rehiring Eccleston 
following the arbitral decision and award.31 
In light of the liberal standard applicable in the current procedural context, we 
conclude that IBT has presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a prima facie case 
of improper motivation under the Act based upon the timing of the Town's decision, the 
lack of evidence concerning the Town's decision, to target Eccleston's position for 
abolition, the sudden transfer of Highway Department funds at the end of 2009, and the 
disparate treatment toward nonunit employees. Although the burden of proof of 
demonstrating a violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) remains with IBT upon remand, the 
burden of persuasion shifts to the Town to demonstrate a legitimate non-discriminatory 
business reason for abolition of the position. 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ's decision to dismiss the charge 
at the conclusion of the IBT's case. Nothing in our decision, however, should be 
construed as constituting a ruling on the merits with respect to IBT's charge or as 
limiting the ALJ's discretion in developing a.more complete record. 
Supra, note 30. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that IBTs charge is reinstated and the case 
remanded to the ALJ to process the charge consistent with our decision. 
DATED: November 14, 2012 
Albany, New York 
JUltfWAy 
.(Jerome Lefkdwitz, Chairperson 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to the Board oh exceptions filed by Local 1440, United 
Transportation Union, AFL-CIO (Local 1440) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice charge filed by the Staten Island Rapid Transit 
Operating Authority (SIRTOA) alleging, inter alia, that Local 1440 violated §209-a.2(b) 
by submitting its Pension/Retirement proposal to interest arbitration. In the decision, 
the ALJ concluded that the proposal is nonmandatory and directed Local 1440 to 
withdraw it from interest arbitration.1 Prior to issuance of the ALJ's decision, the 
designated interest arbitration panel issued its decision and award, which rejected Local 
1440's Pension/Retirement demand.2 
1
 45 PERB 1J4588 (2012). 
2
 See, SIRTOA and Local 1440, PERB Case No. TlA-2010-034, M-2010-155, available 
Case No. U-30628 
Following the filing of the exceptions, Local 1440 and SIRTOA submitted a 
stipulation to the Board requesting modification of the ALJ's decision, pursuant to 
§213.6(a) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), by deleting that portion of the decision 
with respect to SIRTOA's objection to the arbitrability of Local 1440's 
Pension/Retirement proposal including the ALJ's order that the demand be withdrawn. 
In addition, the parties jointly request that we approve SIRTOA's request to withdraw 
that portion of its charge concerning Local 1440's Pension/Retirement proposal 
pursuant to §204.1 (d) of the Rules. 
Based upon our consideration of the ALJ's decision, and the terms of the parties' 
stipulation, we grant the relief sought by the parties. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the ALJ's decision is modified to delete that 
portion finding that Local 1440 violated §209-a.2(b) by submitting its 
Pension/Retirement proposal to interest arbitration and ordering that the demand be 
withdrawn. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that SIRTOA's request to withdraw its charge as it 
relates to Local 1440's Pension/Retirement proposal is approved pursuant to §204.1 (d) 
of the Rules. 
DATED: November 14, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Jp^TWA^ 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairpe'rson 
-Q_— 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, the Certified Union by Nassau Local 
830 (CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper 
practice charge alleging that the County of Nassau (County) violated §209-a.1(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when the County Executive refused to 
submit a signed County-CSEA memorandum of agreement (MOA) dated January 25, 
2011, to the County Legislature for further action.1 At the hearing before the ALJ, the 
. County rested without calling a witness. 
1
 AC D C D D CT/1KVS (r)r\Ar)\ 
In his decision, the ALJ concluded that the County did not violate §209~a.1(d) of 
the Act because the County Executive believed that the County Legislature would not 
approve the MOA, and therefore, submission would have been a useless act. 
In its exceptions, CSEA asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that the County 
Executive knew that the County Legislature would not, in fact, approve and ratify the 
MOA, and erred in concluding that the County did not violate §209-a.1(d) of the Act by 
failing to submit the MOA for ratification and approval. The County has not filed a 
response to the exceptions. 
Based upon our review of CSEA's exceptions, we reverse the ALJ's decision and 
conclude that the County violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act. 
FACTS 
After good faith concessionary bargaining between CSEA and the County aimed 
at alleviating the County's current fiscal crisis, the parties entered into an MOA on 
January 25, 2011. Prior to signing the MOA, the County determined that its terms 
would result in net savings for the County of at least seventy million dollars. Although 
the MOA states that it was subject to "approval" by the County Legislature and 
"ratification" by the CSEA members in the unit, the record reveals that the parties x 
agreed that the MOA would be submitted for CSEA ratification only after it was ratified 
and approved by the County Legislature.2 
Under the MOA, all newly hired CSEA unit employees would be subject to a new 
graded salary Plan D, resulting in their receiving a lower salary rate in the first nine 
steps than current unit employees would receive under the preexisting graded salary 
Plan C. The MOA also provided for an extension of the parties' collectively negotiated 
agreement for two additional years through December 3*1, 2017, and provided for 3.25% 
salary increase for all employees in graded salary plans effective January 1, 2016 and 
January 1, 2017. In addition, the MOA provides that the new graded salary Plan D for 
new employees can be nullified at CSEA's discretion if control over County finances is 
taken over by the Nassau Interim Finance Authority (NIFA) or any other entity. 
Following signing of the MOA on January 25, 2011, the County Legislature 
Majority Leader told the CSEA Unit President that he would support the agreement. A 
press release issued by the County the same day, which declared the MOA to be an 
"historic agreement," generated negative press coverage. 
On January 26, 2011, NIFA approved a resolution imposing a control period on 
the County, pursuant to Public Authorities Law §3669, based upon 
its determination that there is a substantial likelihood and 
imminence of the County incurring major operating funds 
deficit of one percent or more in the aggregate results of 
operations during its fiscal year assuming all revenues and 
expenditures are reported in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles.3 
Less than a week after the MOA was signed, the County Executive and the 
Deputy County Executive told the CSEA Unit President that the MOA would not be 
submitted to the County Legislature because the County Legislature Majority Leader 
had withdrawn support for it due to media criticism. From his conversations with the 
County Executive and Deputy County Executive, the CSEA Local President understood 
that the MOA was not forwarded to the County Legislature for ratification and approval 
because the County Executive did not believe it would pass. 
3
 An Article 78 proceeding commenced by the County and the County Executive . 
seeking vacatur of NIFA's imposition of a control period was dismissed. See, County of 
Nassau v Nassau County Interim Finance Auth, 33 Misc3d 227 (Sup Ct Nassau County 
On March 24, 2011, NIFA issued a resolution imposing a wage freeze upon the 
County pursuant to Public Authorities Law §3669.3. 
DISCUSSION 
Under §§201.12 and 204-a.1 of the Act, legislative approval of an agreement is 
required concerning terms that require statutory amendment or additional funding.4 In 
addition, when parties have agreed that a tentative agreement is to be ratified, each 
side is affirmatively obligated to present it to their ratifying entity and to support its 
approval.5 
In the present case, the parties agreed that the MOA would be submitted to the 
County Legislature for ratification and approval. The failure of the County Executive to 
submit the MOA for ratification or approval constitute violations of §209-a.1(d) of the 
Act. The fact that the County Executive may have believed that the agreement would 
not be legislatively ratified and/or approved does not excuse his legal obligation under 
the Act to submit and support it before the County Legislature. 
Based upon the foregoing, CSEA's exceptions are granted, and the ALJ's 
decision is reversed. Nothing in our decision, however, shall be construed as limiting or 
affecting the powers, authority and duties vested with NIFA under the Nassau County 
Interim Finance Authority Act.6 While the bilateralism central to collective negotiations 
under the Act can lead to voluntary terms to help stem an employer's fiscal problems, 
NIFA is granted certain powers under Public Authorities Law §§3669.2, 3 and 4 as the 
result of its imposition of a control period. 
4
 See, Board ofEduc for the City Sch Dist of Buffalo v Buffalo Teachers Fedn, Inc, 89 
NY2d 370, 29 PERB 1J7506 (1996). 
5
 Union Springs Cent Sch Teachers'Assn, 6 PERB 1J3074 (1973); City of Rochester, 7 
PERB H3060(1974). 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the County: 
1. Submit the January 25, 2011 County-CSEA memorandum of agreement to 
the County Legislature for its ratification and approval; 
2. Sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic locations 
normally used for communication with unit employees. 
DATED: November 14, 2012 
Albany, New York 
fi Jerome Lefkowit^/Chairperson 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Nassau, in the unit represented 
by that Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
the Certified Union by Nassau Local 830, that the County will: 
1. Submit the January 25, 2011 County-CSEA memorandum of 
agreement to the County Legislature for its ratification and approval. 
Dated . . . . . . . . . . By . . 
On behalf of the County of Nassau 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MONROE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-31076 
- and -
COUNTY OF MONROE and SHERIFF OF MONROE 
COUNTY, 
Respondent. 
TREVETT CRISTO SALZER & ANDOLINA, PC (DANIEL P. DeBOLT of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
HARRIS BEACH PLLC (KARLEE S. BOLANOS and WILLIAM Q. LOWE, of 
counsel) for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions by the County of Monroe and the 
Sheriff of Monroe County (Joint Employer) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) on an improper practice charge filed by the Monroe County Deputy Sheriffs' 
Association, Inc. (Association), finding that the Joint Employer violated §209-a.1(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally reassigned to nonunit 
employees security screening on the premises of the Monroe County Jail (Jail) and the 
Monroe County Correctional Facility (Correctional Facility) that had been exclusively 
performed by Association unit members.1 
In its exceptions, the Joint Employer asserts that the ALJ erred in defining the at-
issue work, and in finding that the Association has exclusively performed that work. In 
addition, the Joint Employer contends that there has been a substantial change in job 
qualifications, and that the charge should have been dismissed as untimely. The 
Association supports the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision. They are repeated here 
only as necessary to address the exceptions. 
The Association represents a bargaining unit composed of Deputy Sheriffs, Line 
Deputies and Sergeants working in the Jail located in the City of Rochester, and in the 
Correctional Facility, which is situated in the Town of Henrietta. 
Prior to April 2011, Association unit employees assigned to the central control in 
the Jail's lobby were solely responsible for visual and verbal screening of all visitors 
including attorneys, investigators, probation officers and contract medical staff. Visitors 
were screened by comparing their identification with security and access information 
maintained in the computer system. In addition, Association unit employees were solely 
responsible for screening visitors for contraband by inspecting bags and briefcases, by 
utilizing a hand held magnetometer, and by directing visitors to place contraband into 
lockers. Certain familiar visitors, such as attorneys with proper identification, were 
admitted without screening for contraband. 
For two years prior to April 2011, however, visitor access to the Jail visitation area 
required initial entry through the entrance of the Public Safety Building, a separate 
building adjacent to the Jail. Upon entering the Public Safety Building, a visitor can 
proceed to the court building or the visitation area of the Jail. With the exception of 
attorneys with proper identification, visitors were screened at the entrance to the Public 
proceeding to the Jail visitation area were subject to a second screening with a 
magnetometer and line scanner performed solely by Association unit members. 
Beginning in April 2011, the Joint Employer began modifying the Jail's screening 
procedures in response to an inmate escape. Under the revised procedures, all visitors 
entering through the Jail lobby are now subject to screening at a post situated in front of 
central control, which utilizes a magnetometer and line scanner. In addition, visitors may 
be subject to additional screening with a hand held metal detector. Any contraband 
discovered must be placed in a locker before a visitor approaches central control, where 
unit employees continue to check visitor identification and confirm access clearance. 
The magnetometer screening post in the Jail lobby is staffed by both unit and nonunit 
employees. 
The Joint Employer also implemented modifications in visitor screening 
procedures at the Correctional Facility in reaction to the inmate escape. Previously, unit 
employees were solely responsible for screening visitors at that facility's central control, 
and utilizing a magnetometer, if necessary. In addition, visitors seeking entrance to that 
facility's visitation room were screened solely by unit employees utilizing a hand held 
magnetometer. In May 2011, a magnetometer and a line scanner were installed at a 
post in the Correctional Facility's lobby to screen visitors before they proceed to central 
control or the visitation room. Both unit employees and nonunit employees are assigned 
to magnetometer screening post. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin with the Association's argument that the exceptions are deficient 
because the Joint Employer did not comply with §213.2(b)(3) of our Rules of Procedure 
While the exceptions contain only one reference to record evidence, the Joint 
Employer's thorough brief includes multiple citations to the record. Based upon the 
content of the brief, we conclude that Joint Employer satisfied the mandate of 
§213.2(b)(3) of the Rules, and therefore deny the Association's procedural argument. 
Similarly, we reject the Joint Employer's procedural claim that the ALJ erred by 
failing to dismiss the charge as untimely pursuant to §204.1 (a) of the Rules. The issue 
of timeliness was not raised by the Joint Employer in its answer, during the hearing or in 
its post-hearing brief. While an ALJ has discretion to raise the issue of timeliness based 
upon facts first revealed during a hearing,2 the record in this case did not warrant the 
ALJ's application of that discretion because the alleged untimeliness of the charge did 
not become apparent at the hearing. In fact, the charge was timely filed under our 
) Rules, 
We next turn to the merits of the Joint Employer's substantive exceptions. When 
deciding whether the transfer of unit work violates §209-a.1(d) of the Act, there are two 
essential questions that must be resolved: a) was the at-issue work exclusively 
performed by unit employees; and b) was the work assigned to nonunit personnel 
substantially similar to that exclusive unit work. If both these questions are answered in 
the affirmative, we will find a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act unless there has been a 
significant change in job qualifications.3 
In determining the related issues of the scope of unit work and exclusivity in 
transfer of unit work cases, we examine whether an enforceable past practice exists by 
j 2 See, §212.4(1) of the Rules; City ofElmira, 41 PERB P018 (2008). 
3
 C o o A / i ' o r t a r a C m n f m r T r a n c n A i ith 1 R D P R R < T 5 n « 9 M Q « ^ ' T n n / n n f P i l / o r h o a W AO P P R R 
applying the following test: whether the "practice was unequivocal and was continued 
uninterrupted for a period of time under the circumstances to create a reasonable 
expectation among the affected unit employees that the [practice] would continue."4 
Among the criteria we consider in determining whether a past practice has established a 
discernible boundary are the geographic location of the work, the nature and frequency 
of the work, and other facts establishing that the at-issue work has been treated distinct 
from other work performed by nonunit personnel.5 
In City of Rochester6 we found that the proper definition of the work in that case 
was directing traffic at a single location, which had been exclusively performed by unit 
employees for 13 months.7 More recently, in County of Columbia,8 we affirmed the 
definition of unit work as certain duties performed in the non-secure administrative area 
of a county's Public Safety Building based upon the existence of a discernible boundary 
between the work performed by the unit employees in the administrative area and the 
work assigned to inmates in the secure area of the same building. Therefore, we reject 
the Joint Employer's argument that work location is irrelevant to defining the at-issue 
4
 Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB f3005 at 3024 (2008), confirmed and mod, in part, 
Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bc/,.6'1 AD3d 1231, 42 PERB 
1J7004 (3d Dept 2009), on remittitur, 42 PERB 1J3016 (2009); Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, . 
40 PERB 1J3012, at 3046-47(2007) (quoting from County of Nassau, 24 PERB 1J3029 at 3058 
[1991 ])(subsequent history omitted). See also, County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Sheriff, 
44 PERB H3038(2012). 
5Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, supra, note 4. 
6
 21 PERB 1J3040 (1988), confirmed sub nom., City of Rochester v New York State Pub EmpI 
Rel Bd, 155 AD 2d 1003, 22 PERB 1J7035 (4th Dept 1989). 
7
 See also, Hudson City Sch Dist, 24 PERB 1J3039 (1991). 
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work and determining exclusivity. 
Following our review of the record in the present case and the arguments of the 
parties, we affirm the ALJ' s definition of the at-issue work as security screening of all 
visitors on the Jail and Correctional Facility premises, which has been exclusively 
performed by unit employees. Although the reassigned work involves the use of 
recently installed new magnetometers and line scanners at both facilities, the screening 
duties performed are substantially similar to the work previously performed exclusively 
by Association unit members. Contrary to the Joint Employer's argument, the fact that 
nonunit employees have conducted security screening of visitors at the magnetometer 
post at the Public Safety Building entrance does not adversely impact the Association's 
exclusivity of the work on the premises of the Jail and the Correctional Facility. The 
Public Safety Building is a separate building from the Jail and the Correctional Facility 
and the past practice demonstrates that the screening conducted at the Public Safety 
Building's entrance has been treated as distinct from screening exclusively performed 
by unit personnel on the premises of the Jail and Correctional Facility. 
Furthermore, based upon the testimony of the Jail Superintendent,9 we deny the 
Joint Employer's assertion that there has been a significant change in job qualifications. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County of Monroe and the Sheriff of 
Monroe County: 
1. Cease and desist from assigning the work of security screening of visitors 
to the Monroe County Jail and the Monroe County Correctional Facility 
premises to nonunit employees and restore that work to the bargaining unit 
of the Monroe County Deputy Sheriffs' Association; 
Make whole employees in the Monroe County Deputy Sheriffs' Association 
unit who were affected by the transfer of such work to nonunit employees 
for any loss of wages and benefits suffered by reason of that transfer of 
work, with interest at the prevailing maximum legal rate; and 
Sign, post and distribute the attached notice in all locations normally used 
to communicate both in writing and electronically with unit employees. 
DATED: November 14, 2012 
Albany, New York 
/ / Jerome Lefkoj^itz, Chairperson (J 
Sheila S. "Cofe, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Monroe and Sheriff of Monroe 
County in the unit represented by the Monroe County Deputy Sheriffs' Association 
that the County of Monroe and Sheriff of Monroe County will: 
1. Not assign the work of security screening of visitors to the 
Monroe County Jail and the Monroe County Correctional Facility premises to 
nonunit employees and restore that work to the bargaining unit of the 
Monroe County Deputy Sheriffs' Association; 
2. Make whole employees in the Monroe County Deputy Sheriffs' Association 
unit who were affected by the transfer of such work to nonunit employees 
for any loss of wages and benefits suffered by reason of that transfer of 
work, with interest at the prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
on behalf of the County of Monroe and 
Sheriff of Monroe County 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not 
be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO UNITED CHARTER SCHOOL EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-5878 
- and -
BUFFALO UNITED CHARTER SCHOOL, 
Employer. 
MICHAEL DEELY, LABOR RELATIONS SPECIALIST, for Petitioner 
HISCOCK & BARCLAY, LLP (LAURENCE B. OPPENHEIMER, SCOTT M. 
PECHAITIS AND NICHOLAS J. Dl CESARE of counsel), for Buffalo United 
Charter School 
BOARD DECISION, CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND 
ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding has been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) and our Rules of Procedure (Rules). 
Buffalo United Charter School (Buffalo United) has filed objections to the 
determination made by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) concluding that the showing of support submitted by the Buffalo United 
Charter School Education Association, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO (Association) is sufficient. 
for certification without an election pursuant to §201.9(g)(1) of our Rules. Buffalo United 
Case No. C-5878 - 2 -
objects generally to our procedure permitting the certification of an employee 
organization without a secret ballot election. In addition, it asserts that in certain 
instances authorization cards submitted by the Association were induced by misleading 
statements, and obtained by a Buffalo United employee rather than an Association 
representative. 
Since 1967, §207.2 of the Act has evinced a New York public policy preference 
for administratively certifying employee organizations without an election based upon 
authorization cards and other documentation demonstrating majority support, as 
opposed to the results of secret ballot elections.1 Consistent with §207.2 of the Act and 
the Rules, our policy and practice has been to certify without an election when an 
employee organization satisfies our certification requirements. Therefore, we deny 
Buffalo United's policy arguments against certifying the Association without an election. 
In addition, we reject Buffalo United's challenge to the showing of interest submitted by 
the Association, which is based upon unsworn conclusory assertions of purported 
Association misrepresentations. Those assertions lack sufficient probative value to 
'( ' 
warrant the holding of an election or remanding the matter to the Director for further 
investigations-
Based upon our review of the record, it appears that a negotiating representative 
has been selected: 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
1
 See, Town oflslip, 8 PERB fi3049 ^975);-Bethlehem Public Library, 23 PERB P009 
(1990). 
2
 See, Mohawk Valley Gen Hosp, 19 PERB 1J3020 (1986). 
Case No. C-5878 - 3 -
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Buffalo United Charter School Education 
Association, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer in the following unit as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances: 
Included: All instructional staff including teachers, paraprofessionals, long-
term substitute teachers, and academic specialists employed at 
Buffalo United Charter School. 
Excluded: Principal and assistant principals, deans, instructional coaches, 
administrative employees, guards, nurses, family liaisons, 
confidential and managerial employees, temporary employees and 
all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that Buffalo United Charter School shall negotiate 
collectively with the Buffalo United Charter School Education Association, NYSUT/AFT, 
AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either 
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 14, 2012 
Albany, New York A 
Jerome LefkoWitz, CrWrperson 
.'"" Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SHELDON LAMAR HUNT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASENOS. U-29667, U-29791, 
U-29831, U-29880 & U-30226 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
SHELDON LAMAR HUNT, pro se 
CHARLES D. MAURER, ESQ., for Respondent 
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS AN D COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING (KELLIE TERESE WALKER of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These matters come to the Board on a pleading filed by Sheldon Lamar Hunt 
(Hunt), labeled Dialectic Discussion of the Board's Decision and Order, with respect to 
the Board's decision that affirmed the dismissal of five improper practice charges, as 
amended, filed by Hunt against the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, American 
Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (UFT) for alleged violations of §209-a.2(c) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act).1 The Board of Education of the City 
45 PERB H3038(2012). 
Case Nos. U-29667, U-29791, U-29831, U-29880 & U-30226 _2-
School District of the City of New York (District) is a statutory party pursuant to §209-a.3 
of the Act. 
Following our examination of the discussion contained in Hunt's pleading, we 
find no basis to disturb our prior decision. Our adjudicatory jurisdiction under §209-a of 
the Act is limited to determining whether an improper practice has taken place. In his 
current pleading, Hunt sets forth issues that are, at best, tangential to whether the UFT 
violated §209-a.2 of the Act. 
NOW, THEREFORE, Hunt's pleading is denied. 
DATED: November 14, 2012 
Albany, New York 
7-A^W. 
// Jerome Lefko\^itz, Chairperson 
S Sheila S. Cole, Member 
